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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Wfr^oT^
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

No. 20779

THOMAS OSSANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from conviction and judgment in a felony case in the
Third Judicial District Court before the Honorable Philip R.
Fishier.

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
39 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

FILED
IHN3 01987

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

No. 20779

THOMAS OSSANA,
Defendant/Appellant.
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
COMES
Court

NOW

for

a

misapprehended

the

Defendant

rehearing
the

facts

for
and

and Appellant
the

and petitions

reason

overlooked

that

the

the

decision

the

Court
of

the

United State Supreme Court in United States v. Loud Hawk,
U.S.

, 106 Sup. Ct. 648 (1986) which was rendered after the

oral argument of the instant case.
In Loud Hawk. the Supreme Court set out the factors to be
considered in evaluating delay attributable to an interlocutory
appeal by the government:
In assessing the purpose and reasonableness of
such an appeal, courts may consider several
factors.
These include the strength of the
Government's position on the appealed issue, the
importance of the issue in the posture of the
case, and — in some cases — the seriousness of
the crime.
United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d
1139, 1146 (CA5 1978) (Wisdom, J . ) . For example,
a delay resulting from an appeal would weigh
heavily against the Government if the issue were
clearly tangential or frivolous. Ibid.
106

Sup.

Ct. at

656.

Thus,

the Supreme

Court has

recently

adopted the analysis suggested by appellant here in his opening

brief, pp. 14-18.
be

counted

Delay caused by an interlocutory appeal will

against

the

government

unless

the

government's

position is strong and the appeal was reasonably necessary
if the issue raised were tangential, it should be weighed heavily
against the government.
In this case, the County Attorney brought a collateral civil
case rather than an interlocutory appeal.

It is appellant's

position that this aggravated the situation since it removed the
cause from the criminal procedural system with its intrinsic
checks against delay.

Certainly, the standard for a collateral

review should not be less stringent than for an interlocutory
appeal.
The decision of this Court did not address the merits or the
necessity of the County Attorney seeking collateral relief and
instead

focused

on

whether

the

defendant's

counsel

affirmative steps to push the collateral proceedings.

took
It is

submitted that under Loud Hawk the key question is whether the
criminal action should have been interrupted at all.
The prosecutor had clear alternatives to the drastic course
pursued in this case.

As this Court observed in its decision in

the collateral case, the prosecutor could have chosen to return
the money seized

from the defendant and thereby removed the

predicate for the discovery order.
740, 742, n.3 (Utah 1984).

Cannon v. Keller, 692 P. 2d

The dilemma of the prosecutor was of

his own making as he sought to maintain the inconsistent claims
of the materiality of the money and the non-materiality of its
-2-

source.
It

Ibid.
is

important

that

the prosecution

"made no

factual

showing respecting harm resulting from disclosure" either at the
hearing on the discovery order, Ibid., 740 P.2d at 743, or at the
hearing
district

on the motion to dismiss the criminal
court below.

case in the

At the trial below, the "informant"

testified that he was not contacted regarding whether he had a
desire to remain anonymous following the date of the alleged
purchase (T-166, R-416) and that he "didn't know why they didn't
do it {reveal his identity] a long time ago," (T-168, R-418).

It

is apparent that the prosecutor made no effort to determine if
there was any reason why he should not simply comply with the
discovery order and reveal the informant's identity.
The merit of the collateral action was addressed by this
Court in its decision on that matter which characterized the
county attorney's argument as "attenuated."
supra at 742.

Cannon v. Keller,

That case was clearly neither "close" nor did it

involve novel questions that needed to be settled.

Regardless of

the merits, the issue was entirely tangential to the question of
guilt or innocence.
In the instant case, the state made no effort to either
justify the merits of the County Attorney's position in the
collateral

case or, more

importantly, advance any reasonable

purpose for initiating it.
The concurring opinion did address the apparent bad faith of
-3-

the County Attorney but found it vitiated by the finding of the
District Court in its rulings for the County Attorney in the
collateral proceeding.
analysis

is

also

It is respectfully suggested that this

faulty

because

the

District

Court

in the

collateral action did not ever consider the necessity for the
action nor weigh that necessity against the defendant's
public's right to a speedy trial.

and

The District Court initially

found that Circuit Courts lack jurisdiction to issue discovery
orders, then on rehearing reversed that ruling, on the urging of
the Attorney General, and held that the discovery order was
invalid because the findings of fact were not detailed enough.
Even if it were assumed, contrary to this Court's unanimous
holding, that the district court was correct, it is submitted
that freezing a criminal prosecution for months to review the
adequacy of findings on an evidentiary ruling constitutes delay
to resolve a "tangential" matter under Loud Hawk, supra,
should be weighed heavily against the state.

which

However, since the

collateral proceeding was a civil case, the District Court in
that matter was not concerned with whether the action ought to
have

been

brought

but

instead

focused

on

resolving

the

controversy between the County Attorney and the Circuit Court.
The district court's resolution of that controversy did not in
any way determine whether the County Attorney was acting with
good judgment, not to mention good faith, in staying the criminal
action and presenting the controversy.
This Court's decision repeatedly stresses the importance of
-4-

the misapprehended fact that the defendant himself stayed the
preliminary hearing.

The record does not show that the defendant

ever stayed the preliminary hearing.

The steps taken by the

defendant on March 1, 1987, were explained and documented in
detail in Appellant's Reply Brief pp. 3-5.

Suffice it to say

that Appellant, in order to protect his rights and those of the
Circuit Court, stayed the effect of a spurious, if not bogus,
purported

order

of

the

district

court

in

the

collateral

proceeding for a period of seven days.
Even if appellant's counsel had not taken this action, it
is highly unlikely that the Attorney General would have failed to
take similar action as that office also was seeking a rehearing
of

the

ruling

that

Circuit

Courts

lack

jurisdiction

over

discovery.
From November 12, 1980, until January 31, 1985, "all actions
pending in the Fifth Circuit Court" in the criminal case were
stayed by the ex parte order obtained by the prosecutor.

The

Circuit Court was restrained from hearing any motions to dismiss
or for "an expedited preliminary hearing."
Both the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion seem to
take

the

position

that

the

delay

became

the

appellant's

responsibility when he continued to contest the collateral case.
It is conceded that appellant could have chosen not to appeal the
second ruling (the Circuit Court was contesting the first ruling
whether the appellant did or did not) and thereby shortened the
delay.

However, where a collateral decision is not only clearly
-5-

erroneous but delivered in an action which was brought without
any justification, it seems unreasonable to require a defendant
to choose between foregoing his rightful discovery rights or his
Constitutional right to a speedy trial.

It cannot be said that

because the defendant elected to appeal the collateral decision
that he "wanted" to delay the trial.

He was entitled to either

his discovery or his money and his right to a speedy trial.
It is submitted that this Court should rehear this matter in
order to apply the Loud Hawk analysis which would weigh delay
caused

by

the

prosecutor's

effort

to

collaterally

review a

tangential matter heavily against the state.

Respectfully submitted on this
3 0 ^ day of June, 1987.

JpHN D. O'CONNELL
Attorney for Appellant
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